

Exhibit 7



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The Central Council heard a report read by Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas), Secretary General of the Executive Council and the head of the Palestinian negotiating delegation. In the beginning of the report Abu Mazen explained the preparations made for attending Camp David. He summarized the results of communications and consultations that preceded the summit, saying, "the strange thing is that the Americans realized the need for preparations and agreed with us on the importance of leaving enough time for adequate preparation, but at the same time they were insistent on holding the summit, as though they were trying to lure us in." In his report Abu Mazen added: "We agreed with Albright on a two week preparation period. Afterwards we were surprised by a phone call from President Clinton who told us that the summit would be held within a week. When pressed on the subject of preparations he said that delegations could have two days before the conference to prepare. After that, we were certain that the Americans had their own calculations and that they wanted to go to the summit immediately, at any cost. We had one of two choices, either agree knowing that failure would be a real possibility and that the Americans would hold us responsible for the result, or refuse, upset negotiations, and hinder the peace process. We preferred the former."

Abu Mazen mentioned the eighty legal experts, consultants, and cartographers that accompanied the delegation and praised their efforts in the preparation process. Regarding the pressures faced by Abu Ammar (Yasser Arafat), he said: "essentially all of the pressure, threats, and challenges were directed towards Abu Ammar, who persevered and performed admirably because he knew exactly what he wanted, what he could give, and what he wanted to take. The goal was clear in his mind. He did not deviate a single moment from the demands of our people and the integrity that we have carried for decades."

He also praised the significant moral support the Palestinian negotiating delegation found through popular demonstrations and letters sent to the team, saying: "no one thought we would emerge from this experience with our heads held high and consciences clear, or that we'd tell the Americans 'No,'--we who were armed with nothing other than our will and our belief in what is right." The report added; "They were expecting us to surrender or that we would come out with an agreement that they could use to blame us, to accuse us of betrayal, surrender, and abandoning the cause. Did they get that? Were their plans foiled? Were they disappointed? I don't know but what I do know is that those who support us were happy and proud and those who hated us had to respect us."

After discussing the oral and written reports presented by Abu Ammar, Abu Mazen, Abu Alaa (Ahmed Qurei) and other members of the delegation, members of the Palestinian Central Council agreed to postpone declaring the establishment of a Palestinian state by a majority vote of 75 to 15. It was clear that those in agreement agreed reluctantly: they raised their hands at Abu Ammar's request, but not because they were convinced it was the best position. The decision was welcomed by Israel, America, Europe, and the Arab world, but Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were angry at what they considered an American trick to waste time. In their final report, the Council, under the influence of Abu Ammar, connected the declaration of a Palestinian state with two issues. First, the Executive Committee of the PLO and the Head of the National and Legislative Councils should consider the necessary procedures to announce the establishment of the Palestinian state. Second, the executive political and military leadership should take the necessary steps to prepare the Palestinian people to face the worst, including reprisal attacks against the people and their civilian leadership from Ehud Barak's government.

The statement warned against extremist Israelis exploiting the tense situation between the two parties in order to carry out terrorist attacks against the Palestinians. Those in attendance denounced the terrible massacre perpetrated by the mass murderer Baruch Goldstein in the Cave of the Patriarchs Mosque in Hebron during Rabin's era. Statements from Israeli security officials refusing peaceful solutions to border issues, settlements, Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, in addition to the Israeli army's operations in the village of Sarda near Ramallah and Asira ash-Shamaliya near Nablus, convinced Abu Ammar that conflict was inevitable. This conviction was strengthened when information was released detailing the movements of Israeli army units and security forces in the West Bank and Gaza. Abu Ammar said: "my intelligence, received from trusted Israeli sources, indicates that Israelis worked quickly to plan and train for Operation Field of Thorns and my military brothers understand the meaning of training for such an operation."

The PLO leadership officially refused American threats over continuing with the unilateral declaration of statehood. On July 29, 2000 the PLO decided to progress in the battle to defend the holy city and refugees' rights and the leadership decided to enact the Central Council's decisions regarding declaring statehood. Israeli and Palestinian leadership entered into a conflict over the land as tensions mounted between the two parties.

Amidst increasing military tension in Palestinian lands and a growing conflict among political ranks in Israel regarding sensitive symbolic issues (land, Jerusalem, and settlements), unrest among the Barak government increased. Meanwhile, already high tensions in Palestinian streets reached a boiling point over Israeli talk of partitioning the al-Aqsa mosque. Anything was possible. The question in Palestinian and Israeli streets was which would come first, postponing the declaration of statehood or a bloody conflict. The question for Israeli security forces and political observers was who would set off the explosion: the Palestinian Authority, occupation forces, or both? The Israeli security forces, especially the military and intelligence leadership in the West Bank, assumed that Arafat would be successful in directing the conflict towards the Israeli army and the settlers as he had done many times before.

After the session of the Central Council, Abu Ammar took a quick tour of a number of Arab states to meet presidents, kings, princes, and government officials with the goal of informing them of what happened at Camp David. He asked them to hold an emergency Arab summit but despite the urgency and rationality of his request, they did not agree, recycling the same excuses that had prevented the summit from being held for years. Abu Ammar publicly expressed his appreciation for Arab support for the Palestinians and Jerusalem, with special thanks to the Saudi Arabian leadership for their unlimited political and moral support in solving the Jerusalem issue and protecting refugees' rights. In reality he was angered by limited support from the Arabs alongside the continued weakness of the Islamic world that encouraged Israel and America to increase pressure on Arabs and Palestinians and deny them their rights.

Abu Ammar visited Iran searching for support from the leadership of the Islamic world. He hoped to convince the Iranian leadership, which would head the Islamic Conference, to hold a special Islamic summit for Jerusalem, the first Qiblah and the third holiest city in Islam, and to present a clear Islamic position regarding the American and Israeli ideas that were presented at Camp David. The most important thing he hoped for was a declaration by Muslims refusing Israeli control over neighborhoods

in the holy city and the notion of dividing the land of the al-Aqsa Mosque as had been suggested by the Americans and Israelis at the summit.

In Iran, Abu Ammar was welcomed warmly, melting away years of icy relations between Iran and the PLO. Iranian-Palestinian relations improved to the levels they had reached during the Iranian revolution when the Palestinian revolution offered support for Ayatollah Khomeini. Abu Ammar received significant political and moral support from Iran. As the head of the Islamic conference, the Iranian leadership assured their support for the Palestinian position in the face of American and Israeli pressure and promised to work with Islamic nations to support Palestinian rights and protect Islamic holy cities.

Violent Shakes Among the Ranks of the Israeli Political System

On the other side of the conflict, the Israeli political sphere witnessed significant unrest as Barak's government was shaken in an unprecedented manner, especially after news agencies revealed the details of the concessions that Barak presented at Camp David regarding Jerusalem and the settlements. The Right as well as some supporters from the Labor party and the Left accused Barak of abandoning the cause. Shimon Peres and Yossi Sarid refused Barak's position regarding solving the Jerusalem issue and accused him of acting hastily in presenting suggestions that allowed the Palestinians to control a number of neighborhoods. Members of the Israeli Right, religious and secular alike, called on their forces and united their efforts under the banner of toppling the Barak government. One after another they attacked the Labor party and the Left in an attempt to break the coalition that Barak had built after his election victory under the slogan "One Israel." A number of ministers from the right resigned, adding to those who had done so before the Israeli delegation left for Camp David. A number of ministers from the Labor party assumed the roles of the resigned ministers as Barak was incapable of filling the vacancies in his government and getting the confidence of the Knesset in any ministerial alternatives he put forward.

The Knesset became a theatre. To observers interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it appeared that Israeli extremists against peace with Palestinians had taken control of the Israeli legislature and put a yoke on Barak and his government. To international and regional powers, Israeli society, the government, and the political elite appeared to be prisoners of religious and political extremism and were unprepared to create a real, just, and comprehensive peace with the Palestinians as evidenced by a long period of political instability. Observers noted that supporters of peace in the Labor party like Peres and Ramon hesitated to support Barak in his battle with the Right in defending their convictions regarding peace with the Palestinians. Their differences with Barak manifested themselves on the Israeli political stage and some of them launched a campaign against him. They held him responsible for the collapse of the government alliance and for thrusting the party into an internal and national crisis. After a series of political attacks Barak seemed confused and lost and attempted an escape by taking his anger out on the Palestinians. Using his position as defense minister he order the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to complete planning for Operation Field of Thorns and to set about executing the plan, forgetting that he agreed to resume negotiations with Palestinians.

The Israeli army and security forces went about analyzing and discussing all available information about the military and economic capabilities of the Palestinians including the Fatah Party. Israeli security forces called up their connections to agents in Palestine and involved them in the

mission. The military leadership activated a limited number of reserves and considered plans to station police forces, border guards, armored vehicles and tank units into the West Bank and Gaza. The security agency recognized settlements as essential fighting points for the army and integrated the armed settlers into their local battle plans, tying them to regime forces. In addition to fortifying settlements, the military set aside fuel, arms, ammunition, and all necessary equipment for reserves to confront the worst of possibilities. In order to ensure the plan was implemented either all at once or in stages, the military and political establishment paid significant attention to utilizing political rhetoric and propaganda to deliberately direct international public opinion. This process would turn the perpetrator into the victim in the event clashes broke out with the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Israeli military units spread out on the roads and began provoking Palestinians.

Before his return from Camp David, Barak convinced himself that military, security, and economic pressure on the Palestinian people and their leaders would allow him to extract concessions from the Palestinian leadership regarding Jerusalem, refugees, and land. Having failed to get those concessions peacefully, he believed that rushing into a violent conflict would strengthen his calls for a united front and lessen the intensity of the political attacks he and his nearly-collapsed government were facing. A conflict would also help him justify his failure in reaching an agreement with the Palestinians to supporters of peace.

Before he boarded his flight returning to Tel Aviv, Barak stated that all ideas presented in the talks were void as long as no peace agreement had been reached. However the Israeli Right would not forgive him for agreeing to partition Jerusalem and abandoning it as the united capital of Israel during the talks. [Text illegible]...his agreement over establishing a terrorist and Islamic state next to Israel, and his agreement on [illegible] the settlements destroying the lives of hundreds of settlers who were born and lived there. The Israeli opposition refused to participate in the government called for by Barak, and instead they watched his and his government's downfall. The Right wing parties in his government withdrew from the government coalition as the Left followed and the party alliance that Barak had built fractured more and more. The personality of General Barak was shaken, something that the small and large-scale wars he fought against the Arabs had never managed to do. Further, President Clinton's pro-Israel positions reinforced Palestinian doubts regarding the impartiality of American stewardship, especially after he further pressured the Palestinian leadership to present concessions that would help Barak overcome his domestic crisis. Many within the Palestinian delegation and leadership raised their voices, doubting the possibility of reaching a final peace solution with Barak given the party conflicts facing Israel and the coming end of Clinton's term in office. To them, the actions of the political elite in Israel, both on the Left and the Right, portrayed a society unprepared for a just and comprehensive peace with the Arabs. The hardline Palestinians in power demanded that meetings and negotiations with Barak's government come to a halt. There were increasing calls for following the Hezbollah model, a claim that enjoyed widespread support in Palestinian streets.

The Palestinian leadership warned the American and Israeli administrations that any discussions at Camp David about the al-Aqsa mosque would fan the fires of extremist religious and nationalist violence and possibly threaten the entire peace process and the peaceful relations that had been built up. However, the American president, the Israeli prime minister and their counsels ignored the Palestinians' warnings. The Americans were still clinging to the notion of a greater state while the Israelis were prisoner to their occupiers' mindset, one that despises those they occupy.

Barak and Ben-Ami Provoke Muslims

Instead of objectively studying and learning from the failures of Camp David, the Israeli Prime Minister and his foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami continued their talk of the historic right of the Jews to the Haram al-Sharif. Their rhetoric incited the anger of religious and secular Israeli extremists alike. Despite warnings from Israeli intelligence and security agencies regarding a state of increased tensions in Palestine, Barak and Ben-Ami continued provoking the feelings of frustrated Palestinians and Arabs in plain view of the liberals, the Labor party, and the American administration. They stirred up the anger of religious currents in all Arab nations and many Islamic nations. Their followers began threatening Israel in defense of the Haram al-Sharif, the first Qiblah and third holiest city in Islam. Barak and his security chiefs crowned their positions by facilitating a visit for Sharon to the Haram al-Sharif. They did not heed Arafat and the Palestinian security forces' advice to cancel the trip. Arafat met Barak in his home in the settlement of Kokhav Ya'ir near the city of Qalqiliya to discuss issues related to the negotiations. Many of Barak's chiefs and assistants attended the meeting including Shlomo Ben-Ami. On the Palestinian side, Abu Mazen and Abu Alaa participated in the meeting in which Barak presented the idea of visiting al-Aqsa.

Abu Ammar was surprised by the suggestion and he and the delegation opposed the visit. They advised Barak not to get involved in protecting Sharon. Abu Ammar wondered why Sharon didn't visit while he was Defense Minister or while he was a minister in Netanyahu's government. Barak did not heed the advice and claimed that he could not prevent the opposition leader from going on the visit. Abu Ammar left convinced that Barak was determined to use Sharon to spark a battle with the Palestinians.

The Clash Begins

On the morning of Thursday September 28, 2000, Israeli security forces in Jerusalem were on a state of high-alert as thousands of policemen and security officers gathered in and around the al-Aqsa mosque to protect opposition leader Sharon on his visit to the holy site. The police and security forces received orders to begin the first phase of Operation Fields of Thorns which they had trained well for. The operation allowed for the use of live ammunition against those upsetting public order. The visit occurred in the early morning hours when the mosque was usually nearly empty except for the guards and a few older people praying. A group protesting the visit was present and light clashes with Israeli security forces ensued. The visit lasted only half an hour before pressure from the Palestinians and the guards forced Sharon to leave with his body guards. The visit was a spark that set off a fire that is still burning in the West Bank and Gaza.

As news of the visit spread, anger filled the streets of Palestine. Palestinians recalled the dark history of Sharon starting with the Qibya massacre and Gaza to the war in Lebanon in 1982. They remembered Barak and Ben-Ami's words, talking of the Israeli control of the al-Aqsa mosque that was necessary in order to protect the "structure of the most sacred of Jewish sites from Palestinian frivolity." They connected Sharon's long bloody history of terrorism, his visit, and the talk of protecting the structure with the destruction of the al-Aqsa mosque and the calls of extremists Jews to build a Jewish temple between al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock. People also recalled the many times the mosque had been burned and extremists had tried to sneak in with explosives.

Sharon's visit reminded many of the suggestion presented at Camp David by Dennis Ross, Sandy Berger, Clinton, and Albright to divide the mosque between Muslims and Jews and supply the Jews with a corner for prayer. For religious Muslims this called to mind the image of Jews praying in the Cave of the Patriarchs Mosque in Hebron and the suffering of the Muslims during their prayers. Many rumors spread in the West Bank and Gaza about what the Israeli government and extremist religious groups were saying about al-Aqsa and these rumors informed a widespread Palestinian conviction that the al-Aqsa mosque was in danger and had to be defended.

Whatever Sharon's goals were for his visit or Barak's reasons for facilitating it, the event set off a spark large enough to ignite a wave of anger against the occupation from all different sects and classes of Palestinian society. Everyone took to the streets and attacked the occupying soldiers with rocks and bullets. Some called it a popular movement in the beginning, claiming it was worse than 1996. The following day the conflict exploded on the grounds of al-Aqsa as people were distraught over the depressing results of the peace process and their hatred for the occupation and the settlers. The movement was powerful and spread everywhere.

Abu Ammar called for an emergency meeting in Ramallah on the night of September 28th, 2000 in which he said: "Barak has begun executing Operation Fields of Thorns which I told you all about. The battle of Jerusalem began in Camp David and Sharon's visit has brought it here. Jerusalem is in danger and al-Aqsa is in danger." Given the utmost importance of Jerusalem to Palestinians and all Arabs and Muslims, Abu Ammar was totally convinced that it would be easy to mobilize the Palestinians and Arabs and move them together toward a battle in defense of Jerusalem and the holy sites there.

An official Palestinian statement was issued holding the Israeli government responsible for Sharon's visit and his desecration of the Temple Mount. The statement asked Israel to stop the aggression and slaughter.

In their statement, the leadership called on the Palestinian people to close ranks and unite in battle [text illegible] and face Israeli aggression [text illegible] the Islamic and Christian other,

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القدس... شرارة الانتفاضة.

خطورة الموقف وعدالة الطلب لم يتم التجاوب مع طلبه، وتذرع بعض الزعماء بذات الأعداء التي حالت دون انعقاد القمة عدة سنوات، وسجل أبو عمار قلنا تقديره الكبير لدعم العربي لفلسطين والقدس... وخص بالشكر قيادة المملكة العربية السعودية على دعمها السياسي والمعنوي غير المحدود للموقف الفلسطيني بشأن حل قضية القدس وحقوق اللاجئين، إلا أنه كان في حقيبة الأمر يشعر بغصة في الحلق من محدودية الدعم والإسناد العربيين، ومن استمرار حالة ضعف وموان الأمة التي تشجع إسرائيل والإدارة الأميركية على رفع سقفها على العرب والفلسطينيين وإبتزاز حقوقهم.

وتوجه أبو عمار إلى الدول الإسلامية، وقام بزيارة الجمهورية الإيرانية باحثاً عن نصرة زعماء الدول الإسلامية، وكان يأمل بالنجاح في إقناع القيادة الإيرانية التي تتولى رئاسة المؤتمر الإسلامي بعدد قمة إسلامية استثنائية لنصرة القدس أولى القبلتين وثالث الحرمين، واتخاذ موقف إسلامي واضح من الابتكار الأميركية الإسرائيلية التي طرحت في قمة كامب ديفيد، وأهم ما كان يهدف إليه هو إعلان المسلمين رفض صيغة المشاركة الإسرائيلية في السيادة على أحياء المدينة المقدسة ورفض فكرة تقسيم أرض المسجد الأقصى (تحت وفوق) التي طرحها الأميركيون والإسرائيليون في القمة. وأهم ما كان يهدف إليه هو إعلان المسلمين رفض صيغة المشاركة الإسرائيلية في السيادة على أحياء المدينة المقدسة، ورفض فكرة تقسيم أرض المسجد الأقصى (تحت وفوق) التي طرحها الأميركيون والإسرائيليون في كامب ديفيد.

في إيران استقبل أبو عمار بحفاوة وبخاصة من التيار الإيراني الرسمي المعتدل، وتم كسر الجليد الذي غطى علاقة إيران بمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية سنوات طويلة، واستعادت العلاقة الإيرانية الفلسطينية بعض الجارية التي أحاطت بها في عهد الثورة وقبل الإطاحة بملأه إيران، حين قمت الثورة الفلسطينية بدعم المعنوي والمادي للثورة الخميني، وحصل أبو عمار على دعم معنوي وسياسي إيراني كبيرين، وأكدت القيادة الإيرانية، من موقعها في رئاسة المؤتمر الإسلامي، مساندة الموقف الفلسطيني في وجه ضغوط أميركا وإسرائيل، ووعت بالحرك مع الدول الإسلامية في كل المحافل الدولية لنصرة الحقوق الفلسطينية وحماية المقدسات الإسلامية.

هزة عنيفة في صفوف النظام السياسي الإسرائيلي وفي الجانب الآخر من ساحة الصراع وقعت هزة عنيفة في صفوف النظام السياسي الإسرائيلي واهتزت أوضاع حكومة باراك بصورة لم يسبق لها مثيل. خصوصاً بعد كشف الصحافة ووكالات الأنباء تفاصيل «التنازلات» التي قدمها باراك في قمة كامب ديفيد في قضايا القدس والأرض والاستيطان، وانهمت جميع قوى اليمين وبعض أنصار حزب العمل واليسار باراك بالتفريط ورفض شمعون بيريس ويوسي سريد موقف باراك من حل قضية القدس واتهماء بالتسرع في طرح اقتراح يمنح الفلسطينيين سيادة على عدد من أحيائها. واستنفرت قوى اليمين الإسرائيلي، علمانيين ومثنيين، طاقاتها ووحدت جهودها تحت شعار إسقاط حكومة باراك، وراحت توجه الضربات الموجعة لحزب العمل وقوى اليسار واحدة تلو الأخرى داخل أروقة الكنيست وخارجه، توجهت بتفكك الائتلاف الحكومي الذي بناه باراك بعد فوزه بالانتخابات تحت شعار «إسرائيل واحدة»، واستقال عدد إضافي من وزراء أحزاب اليمين إضافة للذين استقالوا قبل ذهاب الوفد الإسرائيلي إلى قمة كامب ديفيد، وتولى عدد من الوزراء القدامى من حزب العمل مهام الوزراء المستقيلين بالوكالة، وصار باراك عاجزاً عن ملء الشاغر في حكومته وتحول ميعن الكنيست الإسرائيلي مسرحاً مفتوحاً

واستمع المجلس المركزي إلى تقرير خطي تلاه أبو مازن، باعتباره أمين سر للجنة التنفيذية ورئيس الأاطم الفلسطينية للمفاوضات الانتقالية والنهاية. في بداية التقرير عرض أبو مازن مقدمات الذهاب إلى «كامب ديفيد» ولخص نتائج الاتصالات والمشاورات التي سبقت القمة بالقول «الغريب أن الأميركيين كانوا يقررون بضرورة التحضير ويوافقونا على أهمية إفساح المجال للإعداد الجيد والمتكثف، ولكنهم في نفس الوقت كانوا يصرون على عقد القمة، وكانهم كانوا يحاولون استدراجنا لها». وأضاف أبو مازن في التقرير: «جاءت أوليرات وانتقلنا معها على أسبوعين للإعداد الجيد، وبعد أن وافقت فوجئنا بهاتف من الرئيس كليميتشون يدعو إلى قمة خلال أسبوع، وعندما سأل عن الإعداد قال يمكن للوفود القدوم قبل يومين من أجل التحضير. عندها تأكدنا أن لدى الأميركيين حساباتهم وأنهم يريدون الذهاب فوراً للقمة ويأتي ثمن، وأصبحنا أمام أحد خيارين، إما أن نوافق ونحن نعرف مسبقاً أن الفشل سيكون حليف هذه القمة وربما حلفنا الأميركيين نتألم هذا الفشل، وإما أن نرفض ذلك بتعطيل المفاوضات وعرقلة عملية السلام. وفضلنا الخيار الأول».

وأشار أبو مازن في كلمته إلى اصطحاب ثمانية من القانونيين والمستشارين وخبراء الخرائط وإشاد بأعمالهم التحضيرية. وعن الضغوط التي تعرض لها أبو عمار قال: «كانت كل الضغوط والتهديدات والإغراءات موجهة أساساً إلى الاخ أبو عمار الذي صمد أمامها وتحملها بكل القدار، لأنه كان يعرف بالضبط ماذا يريد، وماذا يمكنه أن يعطي وماذا يريد أن يأخذ. فقد كانت الصورة واضحة في ذهنه لا تنحرف لحظة ولا لحظة عن الخط المستقيم المتمثل بمطالب شعبنا وبالأمانة التي تحملها على اكتافنا وحملناها عقوداً طويلة».

وأشاد أبو مازن أيضاً بالدعم المعنوي الكبير الذي تلقاه الوفد الفلسطيني المفاوض من خلال التظاهرات الشعبية والرسائل الموجهة للوفد، وقال: «لم يكن يخطر ببال أحد أننا سنخرج من هذه التجربة مرفوعي الرأس والهامة مرتاحي النفس والضمير والوجدان، أو نقول للأميركان لا، نحن الذين لا نملك من مصادر القوة واللباس والصمود إلا الإرادة والإيمان بالحق». وأضاف التقرير: «كانوا من خارج الاسوار في مختلف البقاع يتوقعون بين لحظة وأخرى أن ينتشر الدخان الأبيض، وأن نخرج باتفاق يلومونا عليه ويجرحونا من أجله، ويوجهون لنا كل الاتهامات بالتخوين والتفريط والتنازل، ولكن هل أسقط في أيديهم؟ وهل أصيبوا بالإحباط هل خاب ظنهم وقالهم؟ لا أدري، ولكن ما أدريه هو أن من أحبنا سعد بنا والمتحضر، ومن كرهنا أجبر على احترامنا...»


بعد مناقشة التقارير الشفوية والخطية التي عرضها أبو عمار وأبو مازن وأبو علاء وأعضاء آخرون في الوفد المفاوض، وافق أعضاء المجلس المركزي على تأجيل إعلان قيام الدولة بأغلبية ٨٥ صوتاً، وعارضه ١٥ عضواً. وكان واضحاً أن الموافقين وافقوا على مضمون ورفضوا أيديهم استجابة لطلب أبو عمار وليس نتيجة قناعة بصحة الموقف. ولقي القرار ارتياحاً أميركياً إسرائيلياً وأوروبياً وعربياً، قابله انزعاج جماهيري فلسطيني واسع واعتبره الناس في الضفة وقطاع غزة حملة أميركية متشوقة هدفها تقطيع الوقت وعند صياغة النيان الختامي عن أعماله، ربط المجلس، بناء على تدخل أبو عمار، تأجيل إعلان قيام الدولة الفلسطينية بإجراء عين عظيم الأولى مشروع اللجنة التنفيذية لمنظمة التحرير ورئاسة المجلس الوطني والتشريعي باتخاذ

طرحت في المفاوضات لاغية، إلا أن قوى اليمين لم تغفر له موافقته في «الكامب» على تقسيم «تفريطه» بها كمدينة موحدة وعاصمة إسرائيل وهذا الرب لبني إسرائيل... وموافق على

Al Ayyam, 30/3/01

30/3/01


الأحد ٣٠



حتى لو لم تتحرك السلطة الرسمية، وعقب بيان للسلطة الرسمي حمل الحكومة الإسرائيلية مسؤولية زيارة شارون وتدنيسه الحرم القدسي وما نتج عنها، وطالبها بوقف العدوان ومحا من المجزرة.

ودعت القيادة في بيانها الشعب الفلسطيني إلى رفض الصفوف والتوحيد في معركة ومواجهة العدوان الإسرائيلي المبيت، الإسلامية والمسيحية الأخرى، وطالبت العربية والإسلامية وزعمائها بالتصالح مع الشعب الفلسطيني المصمم على الدفاع عن الدينية والتاريخية فيها، ودعت الأمم المتحدة السلام والدول الأوروبية والصين والمجد تحمل المسؤولية وإنقاذ عملية السلام من بعد اجتماع القيادة السياسية تراء ساعة متأخرة من ذات المساء اجتماعاً لمجلس الأمن القومي الأعلى، تحدث فيه موسسة نسيباً بالقباس لحدثه في السياسة، وقر أن المعركة بدأت وستكون على موقع المسجد الأقصى في فكر الناس زيارة شارون قراراً خاطئاً ارتكبه باراك بنم، وسوء تقدير نتائج اللعب بالمحرمات والدينية.

ورأى في زيارة شارون محاولة منه الفلسطينية للدخول في صدام عنيف، والفلسطينيين الدفاع عن المسجد الأقصى ومسيحيين ومسلمين ولا يمكن للمرء أن يهاجمه أن يخرج من معركة للتدخل أخرى، وأه النبوي الذي يقول إن الناس في بيت المقدس من أجل أن يوه الدين واستمر الحبيب حول مكة والقديس في بيت المقدس.



القدس .. شرارة الانتفاضة.

للأقصى، وفوجئ أبو عمار بما طرحه باراك واعترض هو والوفد المرافق له على الزيارة، وتحصنوا باراك بعدم القبول في حماية شارون، وتنازل أبو عمار لماذا لم يقدم شارون بالزيارة عندما كان وزير الدفاع، أو عندما كان وزيراً في حكومة نفتاليم. لكن باراك لم يراجع موقفه، وقرر أن يذهب إلى القدس.

ملححت في المفاوضات لإغية، إلا أن قوى اليمين الإسرائيلي لم تغفر له موافقته في الكامب، على تقسيم مدينة القدس وفريضة، بها كمدينة موحدة وعاصمة إسرائيل إلى الأبد. ولم تنفرد تنازله عن أكثر من ٩٠٪ من أرض الميعاد، الشره عندما لم يكتف، إسرائيل، وأه القدس على القدس.

ابن عامي يؤججان مشاعر المسلمين
 من قراءة اسباب ومدلولات فشل قمة الكامي،
 ضوعية، واصل رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي ووزير
 بالوكالة شلومون بن عامي حديثهما حول الحق
 لليهود في منطقة الحرم القدسي الشريف، وهيجا
 لرفقين الاسرائيليين متدينين وعلمايين وقتحا
 ات داخل المجتمع الاسرائيلي، ورغم تنبيه اجهزة
 انتخابات الاسرائيلية لحالة التوتر الشديدة التي
 اراضي الفلسطينية مضى باراك وين عامي قدما
 مشاعر الفلسطينيين الحبيطين، استغزا مشاعر
 تبصر قوى اليسار وحمائم حزب العمل وانتصار
 اسرائيل، وسمع الادارة الاميركية، وهيجا غرائز
 في جميع ارجاء الوطن العربي وعدد من
 لامية، وراح اتباعه يهددون ويتوعدون اسرائيل
 لاقصى اولى القبلتين وثالث الحرمين الشريفين،
 اك واركانه الاسنيون مواقفهم العنجهية
 ية بتسهيل قيام شارون بزيارة لمنطقة الحرم
 شريف، ولم يستمعوا لتصالح عرفات وقادة
 الفلسطينية تعطيل الزيارة، في حينة التقى
 اراك في منزله في مستوطنة كوخاف باثير
 دنية لقبليبة مناقشة قضايا المفاوضات، وحضر
 عدد من اركان باراك ومسانديه وكان ضمنهم
 عامي، ومن الجانب الفلسطيني شارك ابو مازز